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Pay-Performance Sensitivity and Firm Size: Insights from the
Mutual Fund Industry
George D. Cashman

Rawls College of Business, Texas Tech University, Lubbock

Abstract
I examine the ex ante decision to make an agent's pay-performance sensitivity an inverse function of
organization size. I focus on mutual funds and their decision to use compensation contracts that
reduce the advisor's marginal compensation as the fund grows (a declining-rate contract) over the
dominant contract type, where marginal compensation is unrelated to fund size (a single-rate
contract). I find evidence consistent with the view that declining-rate contracts are a mechanism to
keep marginal compensation in line with the advisor's declining marginal product. Specifically, I find
that funds with greater exposure to diseconomies of scale are more likely to use a declining-rate
contract and to specify a greater amount of compensation decline in their contracts. Consistent with
optimal contracting, I find no evidence of a performance difference between funds with declining-rate
contracts and funds with single-rate contracts.
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1. Introduction
“Company size is the most important but not the only source of heterogeneity in calculated payperformance sensitivities.” Murphy (1999).
Numerous papers find that CEO compensation at large companies is less sensitive to performance than
that of CEOs at smaller companies (for example, Jensen and Murphy, 1990, Conyon and Murphy, 2000,
Hartzell and Starks, 2003, Schaefer, 1998). This inverse relationship suggests that agency problems are
worse at larger firms, because wealth-constrained CEOs “own” less of the company (Murphy, 1999).1 I
examine the ex ante decision to make pay-performance sensitivity an inverse function of size in an
environment without wealth constraints, that of mutual funds. I find that funds choose to make payperformance sensitivity an inverse function of size when the manager's marginal product is also
inversely related to size. This suggests that the lower pay-performance sensitivity at larger companies
may not be indicative of more severe agency conflicts; rather, it may reflect a reduction in the CEO's
marginal product.
Examining a mutual fund manager's compensation offers several advantages over studying realized
CEO compensation for industrial firms. First, the fund manager's future compensation is specified at
the inception of the fund by the advisory contract. This type of contracting, unique to the mutual fund
industry, allows for an examination of the ex ante decision to make an agent's pay-performance
sensitivity an inverse function of size. While industrial firms also contract with their CEOs, Gillan et al.
(2009) find that only about half of the CEOs in the S&P 500 have employment agreements that provide
some details about the CEO's compensation package. However, much of the year-to-year performance
component of pay remains at the discretion of the board. Thus, the overall compensation structure is
not well specified ex ante for the life of the enterprise.
Second, mutual funds exist in a competitive marketplace with little regulation regarding
compensation.2 In a competitive environment, contracts that do not efficiently reduce agency conflicts,
or deliver value, will be competed out of the marketplace (Alchian, 1950). This, combined with the
absence of regulatory influences, suggests that the observed contracts are relatively efficient.
One caveat is that, in examining advisory contracts, I do not directly observe the fund manager's
compensation. Rather, I observe the compensation earned by the company that manages the fund, the
advisory rate. However, the advisory rate is often used to represent the advisor's actual compensation.
For example, Berkowitz and Kotowitz, 1993, Coles et al., 2000, Lemmon et al., 2000, Deli, 2002 all use
the advisory rate to proxy for the advisor's actual compensation. Additionally, using the advisory rate,
Coles et al. (2000) report a pay-performance sensitivity of $5.46 per $1000 increase in investor wealth,
similar to the $6.00 reported by Hall and Liebman (1998) for industrial firms.

The advisory rate is analogous to the pay-performance sensitivity at industrial firms because it specifies
the percentage of growth that the advisor receives as increased compensation. Funds grow either by
growing their current assets (performance), or by attracting capital inflows, which Spitz, 1970, Patel et
al., 1994, Ippolito, 1992, Sirri and Tufano, 1998 all find is positively related to performance. Under a
single-rate advisory contract, compensation is determined by applying a constant advisory rate to fund
assets, while under a declining-rate advisory contract, the manager's compensation is calculated by
applying a base rate to the portion of fund assets below a pre-specified size threshold and a reduced
rate to the portion of fund assets above the threshold. Therefore, a declining-rate advisory contract
represents an ex ante decision to make pay-performance sensitivity an inverse function of size, as the
compensation increase is less than under a single-rate advisory contract.
I first present evidence that the choice of a declining-rate advisory contract is economically significant,
as managers with declining-rate advisory contracts receive compensation that is approximately 9%
lower than comparable managers with single-rate advisory contracts. Second, I present evidence that
declining-rate advisory contracts are used to keep marginal compensation in line with declining
marginal product. Specifically, (a) actively managed funds, (b) equity funds, and (c) equity funds that
pursue aggressive capital appreciation and growth strategies are all more likely to use declining-rate
advisory contracts. Interestingly, I find no evidence of a performance difference between funds with
declining-rate advisory contracts and those with single-rate advisory contracts, which is consistent with
efficient contracting in the mutual fund industry.
My findings suggest that funds ex ante choose compensation schemes that align marginal
compensation with marginal product. That is, an advisor whose marginal product is expected to fall as
the fund grows receives a contract that reduces marginal compensation (pay-performance sensitivity)
as the fund grows. This, in turn, suggests an alternative interpretation of the well-documented inverse
relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and firm size; namely, the CEO's payperformance sensitivity falls as the firm grows because the CEO's marginal product is falling. This is not
to suggest that CEOs of large firms are unproductive, simply that the CEO's marginal product was
greater when the firm was smaller.
In addition to providing general insights into compensation practices, studying advisory contracts is
particularly important for the mutual fund industry. First, there is little theory focusing on the choice of
a declining-rate versus a single-rate advisory contract.3 There is also an absence of empirical work on
this issue, which is surprising given that one-third of all funds controlling almost half of the dollars
under management have declining-rate advisory contracts. Second, my results have public policy
implications. Following the late-trading and market timing scandals, the National Association of State
Treasurers, CalPERS, CalSTRS, and others have supported the Mutual Fund Protection Principles
(MFPP), a set of best-practice recommendations designed to correct perceived problems in the mutual
fund industry. A key recommendation of the MFPP is a requirement that all funds use declining-rate
advisory contracts. This appears to be based on the assumption that declining-rate advisory contracts
will result in savings from economies of scale being passed along to investors.4 However, my evidence
suggests that declining-rate advisory contracts are not used in this manner. As such, mandating the use
of declining-rate advisory contracts is likely to impose substantial costs on many fund investors.

2. Literature review
Coles et al., 2000, Deli, 2002 both examine the determinants of the marginal compensation rate, the
applicable advisory rate for a fund's size. Both present cross-sectional evidence that the marginal
compensation rate is a function of the advisor's marginal product, and that the marginal compensation
rate is negatively related to size. The latter is interpreted as evidence of funds passing along economies
of scale to investors.
Additionally, Deli (2002) examines “concavity,” a measure of the amount of advisory rate decline in the
contract, defined as the difference between the highest and lowest advisory rate divided by the
marginal compensation rate. However, there is a concern with measuring advisory rate decline this
way. Consider the median declining-rate advisory contract, in this study, with four advisory rates:
0.65%, 0.60%, 0.53%, and 0.46%; as a fund grows through this contract, concavity changes from 0.29 to
0.32 to 0.36 to 0.41, while the contract remains unchanged. Because of this, I do not use concavity in
my examination of advisory rate decline.
While neither study explicitly examines the choice of a declining-rate advisory contract, their findings
suggest two possible rationales. First, if the marginal compensation rate is negatively related to size
because funds are passing along economies of scale, then declining-rate advisory contracts may
facilitate this. Alternatively, if marginal compensation rates are a function of marginal product, then
declining-rate advisory contracts may keep marginal compensation in line with an advisor's declining
marginal product.

3. The role of the advisor
The role of an active mutual fund advisor is to efficiently acquire, analyze, and act on information. In a
rational pricing model, such as Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), where information is asymmetrically
distributed and costly to produce, the informed trader (the advisor) gains from trading with the
uninformed. However, as more of these opportunities are executed, more effort is required to find the
next profitable investment. Assuming that effort is costly, an advisor's compensation is tied to
performance to ensure that he or she continues to look for profitable investment opportunities.
In this setting, effort is neither entirely multiplicative (affecting the entire fund) or additive (generating
a fixed-dollar reward) (Edmans et al., 2009). As such, it is unclear whether pay-performance sensitivity
should be measured as “percentage owned” or as “dollars at stake” (Baker and Hall, 2004). However,
declining-rate advisory contracts induce an inverse pay-performance size relation, regardless of how
pay-performance sensitivity is measured. In my sample, an advisor with the average single-rate
advisory contract “owns” 0.67% of the fund, regardless of how large the fund grows, while an advisor
with the average declining-rate advisory contract (with four rates) initially owns 0.66% of the fund,
which falls to 0.62%, a 6% reduction by the time the fund reaches the third advisory rate.5 In terms of
dollars at stake, a $100 million increase generates a $670,000 payday for the advisor with a single-rate
advisory contract, whereas for the advisor with the four-rate contract, a $100 million increase

generates compensation of $662,152, $606,152, $560,197, and $515,615 as the fund moves through
the contract.
One should note that with these general measures of CEO pay-performance sensitivity, performance is
simply firm return. When using advisory rates, performance encompasses both fund return and growth
through capital inflows. However, as mentioned earlier capital inflows are a function of fund returns.

4. Economies and diseconomies of scale
Economies of scale in the mutual fund industry refer to reductions in the expense ratio as the fund
grows (Baumol et al., 1990, Latzko, 1999, Latzko, 2002, Barber et al., 2005). An example of these
savings is presented by Latzko (1999): if the cost of maintaining an account is $40 and the average
account size is $1000, it costs 4% of assets to maintain the account. If the average account size grows
to $2500 the cost falls to 1.6% of assets.
Diseconomies of scale refer to the fact that the advisor is unable to generate the same return (marginal
product) on the next dollar invested with the fund as on the previous dollar, reducing fund
performance (Berk and Green, 2004). Evidence of the negative effect of size on performance is
presented by Bris et al., 2007, Chen et al., 2004, Beckers and Vaughan, 2001. The reduction in the
advisor's marginal product is potentially caused by hierarchy costs and/or transaction costs.6

4.1. Hierarchy costs
Hierarchy costs refer to reductions in a fund's use of “soft” information.7 As a fund grows, the
organizational distance between the security analyst and the advisor increases; this increases the
likelihood that an advisor will reject an analyst's recommendation based on soft information,
decreasing the analyst's incentive to acquire and analyze soft information (Aghion and Tirole, 1997,
Stein, 2002). Performance should suffer as the fund relies more heavily on readily verifiable (hard)
information, which should already be priced in an efficient market.
Evidence that hierarchy costs contribute to diseconomies of scale is presented in Coval and Moskowitz,
1999, Coval and Moskowitz, 2001. The authors find that funds are able to trade local companies at an
information advantage, which they argue arises from soft information acquired through geographical
proximity. Moreover, Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, Coval and Moskowitz, 2001, Chen et al., 2004 find
that smaller funds' investments in local companies outperform larger funds' investments in local
companies, which is consistent with hierarchy costs hindering the ability of larger funds to use soft
information.

4.2. Transaction costs
Transaction costs can also reduce an advisor's marginal product. As a fund grows and engages in larger
trades (dollars and shares), a larger portion of the potential gains are consumed by increasing

transaction costs. Edelen et al. (2007) directly examine the effect of transaction costs on equity fund
performance and find that as transaction costs increase, performance decreases.

5. Empirical predictions
In this section, I outline my empirical predictions. Implicit in the discussion is the assumption that funds
grow. This seems reasonable, as Zhao (2005) finds that smaller funds and those with lower flows are
likely to exit the industry. Similarly, Jayaraman et al. (2002) find that smaller funds and funds that
experience net redemptions are likely merger targets.

5.1. Response to economies of scale
If declining-rate advisory contracts are a means of passing along savings from economies of scale, then
funds with greater potential for economies of scale–namely, indexed funds and debt funds–should be
more likely to use them. Latzko, 1999, Latzko, 2002 finds that the inverse relationship between
expense ratios and size is driven primarily by administrative savings. As administration expenses
represent a larger percentage of the costs of an index fund than an actively managed fund, it seems
reasonable that index funds have greater potential for economies of scale savings.
Regarding debt funds, Schultz, 2001, Edwards et al., 2007 find that transaction costs decrease with
debt trade size. Additionally, Green et al. (2004) find that municipal bond dealers on average earn
lower markups on larger trades than on small trades. Contrarily, Chan and Lakonishok, 1995, Chan and
Lakonishok, 1997, Keim and Madhaven, 1997 find that transaction costs increase with equity trade
size. These findings suggest that debt funds have greater potential for economies of scale than equity
funds.

5.2. Response to diseconomies of scale
If declining-rate advisory contracts are a contracting mechanism for keeping marginal compensation in
line with declining marginal product, then funds with relatively greater exposure to diseconomies of
scale should be more likely to use them. Specifically, I would expect declining-rate advisory contracts
to be more prevalent among actively managed funds, equity funds, and actively managed equity funds
pursuing relatively aggressive strategies, which I define as aggressive capital appreciation or growth.
Actively managed funds should be more likely to use a declining-rate advisory contract because they
have greater exposure to both hierarchy costs and transaction costs. An index fund's focus on tracking
its index limits its use of soft information, while actively managed funds are predicated on using soft
information. This difference exposes actively managed funds to greater hierarchy costs.
Additionally, actively managed funds have greater exposure to increasing transaction costs than index
funds. Index funds limit their investments to indexed firms, which tend to have lower transaction costs
and greater liquidity.8 Actively managed funds do not limit their investments to index firms. As such,

the firms that actively managed funds invest in are less liquid, on average. This implies that transaction
costs should increase faster for actively managed funds than indexed funds as fund size increases.
As mentioned earlier, transaction costs increase with equity trade size and decrease with debt trade
size. This suggests that equity funds have greater exposure to diseconomies of scale than debt funds.
While the predictions above are based on supposition, Chen et al., 2004, Beckers and Vaughan, 2001
document that, among actively managed equity funds, those pursuing more aggressive strategies
experience more severe diseconomies of scale. Therefore, if declining-rate advisory contracts keep
marginal compensation in line with declining marginal product, then actively managed equity funds
pursuing a relatively aggressive strategy should be more likely to use them.

6. Data
My analysis uses data from investment companies' form N-SAR filings with the SEC. N-SARs are
semiannual filings required of all registered investment companies; the N-SARA covers the first six
months of the investment company's fiscal year, and the N-SARB covers the investment company's
fiscal year-end. I collect all N-SARBs from the SEC's Edgar Web site for open-end domestic mutual funds
filed in calendar year 2002. The N-SAR filings provide details about the fund's portfolio, including
whether the fund is actively managed or indexed, whether the fund has a single share class or multiple
share classes, whether the fund invests primarily in equity or debt, and for equity funds the general
strategy pursued by the fund.9 The N-SAR also reports turnover (the lesser of purchases or sales
divided by average net asset value), year-end size, the family (if applicable), the presence of a frontend or back-end load, the minimum investment required to open an account, and the number of
services, beyond portfolio management, required of the advisor.10
In addition to these portfolio details, the N-SAR provides details about the advisory contract;
specifically, whether it has a single advisory rate or multiple advisory rates (declining-rate advisory
contracts). For declining-rate advisory contracts, I collect all advisory rates and the corresponding size
breakpoints.
I have a sample of 4413 domestic open-ended mutual fund advisory contracts with the necessary
information. Table 1 describes the 4413 funds in the sample.11 The sample is weighted toward active
management and equity funds. Funds with declining-rate advisory contracts represent 32% of my
sample, consistent with the 34% reported by Deli (2002).
Table 1. Sample description. I search the SEC's EDGAR Web site for all N-SARB filings during the 2002
calendar year. A declining-rate advisory contract is an advisory contract that specifies several advisory
rates that decline as fund size increases. A single-rate advisory contract is an advisory contract that
specifies only one advisory rate. I examine a fund's answers to various questions on form N-SAR to
determine whether a fund is actively or passively managed and whether the fund invests primarily in
equity or debt. Additionally, I collect fund turnover (the lesser of purchases or sales divided by average
net asset value), fund size, and the services required by the advisory contract. The N-SAR filing asks
specifically if 15 different services are required under the advisory contract. The service variable is the

number of these services that are provided; as such, its maximum value is 15. The N-SAR inquires
about (1) occupancy and office rental; (2) clerical and bookkeeping services; (3) accounting services; (4)
services of independent audits; (5) services of outside counsel; (6) registration and filing rates; (7)
stationery, supplies, and printing; (8) salaries and compensation of interested directors; (9) salaries and
compensation of disinterested directors; (10) salaries and compensation of officers who are not
directors; (11) reports to shareholders; (12) determination of offering and redemption prices; (13)
trading department; (14) prospectus preparation and printing; and (15) other services. For equity
funds, I also collect the fund's stated primary investment objective.
Panel A: Sample composition
Fund type
Total sample
Declining-rate advisory Contracts
Single-rate advisory contracts
Actively managed
Indexed
Equity
Debt

Number
4413
1423
2990
4112
301
3093
1322

% of sample
32
68
93
7
70
30

Panel B: Descriptive statistics for turnover, fund and family size, and the number of services required by the
advisory contract
Mean Median
Maximum
75th percentile 25th percentile
Minimum
Min. invest ($)
84.9
1.0
25,000
1.0
<1
<1
Turnover
97.5
56.0
6593.0
111.0
23.0
<1
Fund size ($ million) 624.0 124.3
99,162.0
412.7
33.2
1.0
Family size ($ billion) 43.2
10.9
686.4
67.4
2.2
<1
Services
5.6
6.0
15.0
8.0
4.0
0.0

7. Univariate analysis
Table 2 presents the univariate analysis of contract characteristics. Panel A shows that the mean
marginal compensation rate for the entire sample is 65.5 basis points, similar to Deli (2002).
Additionally, panel A shows that the mean marginal compensation rate is lower for declining-rate
advisory contracts than for single-rate advisory contracts. In un-tabulated tests, I find that this
difference is significant and that it likely results from a size effect. The initial rate in a declining-rate
advisory contract is 64.7 basis points (mean), which is insignificantly different (un-tabulated) from the
67 basis points for single-rate advisory contracts. This implies that, while the marginal compensation
rates are initially the same for the two contracts, growth pushes the declining-rate advisory contract's
marginal compensation below that of the single-rate advisory contract.
Table 2. Univariate analysis. The sample is composed of 4413 funds that filed N-SAR in the 2002
calendar year. Marginal compensation rate is the advisory fee applicable given the mutual fund's
current size. Average drop is the highest advisory rate specified in the advisory contract minus the

lowest advisory rate divided by the number of advisory rate changes. Range is the highest advisory rate
specified in the advisory contract minus the lowest advisory rate. Aggressive is an indicator variable
that takes the value of one if the fund's stated strategy is aggressive capital appreciation or growth,
and zero otherwise. Contract waiver is the dollar compensation that the advisor is entitled to under the
advisory contract minus the actual dollar compensation received, divided by the dollar compensation
the advisor is entitled to under the contract. Total discount is the dollar compensation that the advisor
is entitled to under the highest advisory rate in the advisory contract minus the actual dollar
compensation received, divided by the dollar compensation the advisor is entitled to under the highest
advisory rate specified in the contract. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels,
respectively.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for marginal compensation rate, average drop, and range
Mean Median Maximum 75th percentile 25th percentile
Minimum
Whole sample
Marginal comp. rate (%)
0.655 0.650
5.000
0.800
0.500
0.100
Single-rate contracts
Marginal comp. rate (%)

0.670 0.650

5.000

0.850

0.500

0.100

Declining-rate contract
Marginal comp. rate (%)
Average drop
Range (%)

0.622 0.600
0.064 0.050
0.148 0.125

2.000
0.600
1.200

0.750
0.075
0.200

0.500
0.038
0.090

0.500
0.039
0.090

Panel B: Proportion of funds that use a declining-rate advisory contract
Actively managed funds Indexed funds
χ2 (P-value)
% of funds with a declining-rate contract 31.8%
15.6%
40.90 (< 0.0001)
% of funds with a declining-rate contract

Equity funds
31.5%

Debt funds
34.0%

χ2 (P-value)
2.62 (0.1053)

% of funds with a declining-rate contract

Aggressive funds
36.7%

Non-aggressive funds χ2 (P-value)
31.5%
7.72 (0.0055)

Panel C: Proportion of funds that waive a portion of their compensation (N = 845 funds)
Single- Decliningχ2 test for equality in
rate
Rate
proportions (P-value)
Percentage of funds that waived a portion of 60.14% 57.88%
228 (0.55)
their compensation

Panel D: Differences in
mean, median savings

Mean
Singlerate (%)

Declining
rate (%)

Median
T-statistics

Singlerate (%)

Declining
rate (%)

Z

Contract waiver (%)

4.1

3.2

0.9% (0.81)

0.2

0.1

− 0.80

Total discount (%)

4.1

11.9

− 7.8%***(− 5.78) 0.2

4.0

9.1***

Lastly, panel A presents descriptive statistics regarding the amount of advisory rate decline. I examine
average drop and range, rather than concavity, because of the bias in concavity discussed in Section 2.
Average drop is the mean advisory rate reduction at each breakpoint. Range is the total difference in
the advisory rates. The mean average drop and range are 9.6% and 23%, respectively, of the mean
single-rate advisory contract's marginal compensation rate.
Panel B of Table 2 reports the proportion of funds that use a declining-rate advisory contract. I find
that both actively managed funds and actively managed equity funds pursuing aggressive strategies are
more likely to use declining-rate advisory contracts. These results suggest that declining-rate advisory
contracts are a response to diseconomies of scale.
It is possible that a fund may use fee waivers to transform a single-rate advisory contract into a
declining-rate advisory contract, by waiving progressively more of its fee as it grows. This potentially
limits the economic distinction between single-rate advisory contracts and declining-rate advisory
contracts.12 To determine if funds use fee waivers in this manner, I explore the probability that a fund
waives some portion of its fee and the amount of the waiver. I first match my sample of actively
managed equity funds to the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund Database (hereafter CRSP). This
results in a sample of 845 funds, 628 with a single-rate advisory contract and 287 with a declining-rate
advisory contract.13 I apply the advisory contract to the average fund size each month to estimate the
entitled compensation. I then aggregate the monthly entitled compensation over the year, subtract the
compensation received, and divide this difference by the entitled compensation; I define this as the
contract waiver.
Panel C presents the proportion of funds that engage in fee waiving, while panel D compares the
average amount of the waiver. I find that funds with declining-rate advisory contracts are just as likely
to waive a portion of their compensation and that they waive the same amount as funds with a singlerate advisory contract. This suggests that waivers are not used to change a single-rate advisory
contract into an implicit declining-rate advisory contract.
Lastly, I examine the economic significance of using a declining-rate advisory contract, by examining
the total discount. This represents the savings from the contract waiver and from contractual
reductions in the advisory rate. I take the first (highest) advisory rate in the contract and apply it to the
average fund size each month and aggregate this maximum possible compensation over the year; I

then subtract the compensation received and divide this difference by the maximum possible
compensation to calculate the total difference.
Panel D of Table 2 reports that the mean (median) total discount for funds with declining-rate advisory
contracts is almost three (20) times that of funds with single-rate advisory contracts. The results
suggest that the choice of a declining-rate advisory contract is an economically significant decision.

8. Contract form
The univariate analysis suggests that the choice of a declining-rate advisory contract is economically
significant and that they are a response to potential diseconomies of scale. I further investigate the
choice of a declining-rate advisory contract, and the amount of advisory rate decline, in a multivariate
setting.

8.1. Choosing a declining-rate advisory contract
I use probit analysis to examine the choice of a declining-rate advisory contract. The dependent
variable is set to one if a fund uses a declining-rate advisory contract, and zero otherwise.
I control for fund characteristics that Coles et al., 2000, Deli, 2002 find affect marginal compensation
rates in the cross-section: turnover, fund size, family size, and services. I also control for fund
characteristics that may reduce a fund's exposure to uninformed liquidity-motivated trading (that is,
uninformed trading that the advisor engages in to meet the liquidity demands of fund investors). In a
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)-style world, uninformed traders lose to informed traders, suggesting that
uninformed liquidity-motivated trading lowers an advisor's marginal product, ceteris paribus.
Specifically, I control for whether the fund offers multiple share classes, the presence of a front-end
load, a back-end load, and the minimum investment amount.14
Table 3 presents the results of the analysis. The intercept represents the probability that a benchmark
fund, where all continuous variables are set to their means and indicators to zero, will use a decliningrate advisory contract. In the full sample analysis (column 1), the benchmark fund is an index debt
fund; this type of fund has the greatest potential for economies of scale and the lowest potential for
diseconomies of scale. The coefficients represent the change in the probable use of a declining-rate
advisory contract when an indicator switches from zero to one, or a continuous variable increases by
two standard deviations.
Table 3. Probit analysis of choosing a declining-rate advisory contract. I regress an indicator variable set
equal to one if the fund uses a declining-rate advisory contract and zero if the fund uses a single-rate
advisory contract. The whole sample is composed of 4413 funds that filed an N-SAR during the
calendar year 2002. The equity subsample is composed of the 2808 funds in the sample that are
actively managed and invest in domestic equity securities. The CRSP equity sample is composed of the
767 actively managed equity funds that I am able to match to the CRSP database. Active is an indicator
variable that takes the value of one if the fund is actively managed and zero if the fund is passively

managed. Equity is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the fund invests primarily in
equity and zero if the fund invests primarily in debt. Aggressive is an indicator variable that takes the
value of one if the fund's stated strategy is aggressive growth or aggressive capital appreciation and
zero otherwise. Multi class is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the fund offers
multiple classes of shares and the value of zero if the fund only has one share class. Front load is an
indicator variable that takes the value of one if the fund has a front-end load and zero otherwise. Back
Load is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the fund has a redemption fee or a
contingent deferred sales charge and zero otherwise. As Multi Class will be perfectly correlated with
front load and back load, I orthogonalize both with respect to multi class. Ln(min invest) is the natural
log of the minimum investment that the fund requires to open an account for an investor. Turnover is
the lesser of the fund's purchases and sales divided by average net assets. Ln(size) is the natural log of
the fund's total net assets. Ln(family size) is the natural log of all assets controlled by the fund's family.
Services is the number of services required by the advisory contract. Sector spread is the average
monthly size range, for funds in the same Strategic Insight Objective Code, in the calendar year
preceding the funds introduction. Sector funds is the number of funds in the Strategic Insight Objective
Code before the fund is introduced. The intercept represents the probability that a fund will choose a
declining-rate advisory contract when all dichotomous variables are set equal to zero and all
continuous variables are set at their mean. The intercept for column 1 of this table represents the
probability that a passively managed domestic debt fund possessing mean turnover, fund size, family
size, and services will choose a declining-rate advisory contract. The coefficients reported for the
dichotomous variable represent the incremental change in the probable choice of a declining-rate
advisory contract when the dichotomous variable changes from zero to one, leaving all other variables
unchanged. In the case of the continuous explanatory variables, the reported coefficient represents
the change in the probability implied by a two-standard-deviation increase. ***, **, * indicates
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

Intercept
Active
Equity

Whole sample
0.109***
(200.69)
0.155***
(40.49)
0.009
(1.33)

Aggressive
Multi class
Front load
Back load
Ln(min invest)

0.045***
(27.89)
0.071***
(11.09)
− 0.013
(0.49)
− 0.037***
(40.54)

Equity sample
0.257***
(127.24)

CRSP equity
0.259***
(37.06)

0.057***
(9.98)
0.092***
(22.27)
0.085*
(2.91)
− 0.056
(1.65)
− 0.058***
(14.69)

0.148***
(15.53)

0.109***
(10.00)
− 0.032
(1.00)

Whole sample
Turnover
Ln(size)
Ln(family size)
Services

0.004
(0.37)
0.087***
(75.32)
0.031***
(11.42)
0.032***
(18.00)

Equity sample
0.008
(0.23)
0.156***
(52.11)
0.074***
(11.66)
0.021
(1.61)

Sector spread
Sector funds
Obs
Psuedo-R2

4413
0.0733

2807
00.0724

CRSP equity
0.049
(2.24)
0.058**
(4.10)
0.180***
(20.65)

0.216**
(4.84)
− 0.206***
(18.01)
767
0.1075

The results in column 1 suggest that the use of a declining-rate advisory contract is a response to
diseconomies of scale. First, the benchmark fund has a 10.9% probability of using a declining-rate
advisory contract, approximately one-third of the unconditional probability. Second, I find that
changing from an index fund to an actively managed fund increases the probability that the fund will
use a declining-rate advisory contract to 26.4%, a 142% increase.15 However, I find no evidence of a
significant difference in the probable use of a declining-rate advisory contract between debt funds and
equity funds.
The results for the actively managed equity fund subsample are presented in column 2. Here the
benchmark is an actively managed equity fund with a relatively non-aggressive strategy. While
comparing the probability that the benchmark funds will use a declining-rate advisory contract is not a
statistical test, the increase from 10.9% to 25.7% is consistent with declining-rate advisory contracts
being a response to diseconomies of scale. Changing the fund's strategy from a relatively nonaggressive strategy to an aggressive strategy increases the probability that the fund will use a
declining-rate advisory contract by 22%, again suggesting that declining-rate advisory contracts are
used to keep marginal compensation in line with declining marginal product.
A potential concern with my analysis is that my arguments refer to the initial advisory contract choice,
while the dataset represents a cross-section of the industry as of 2002. However, there are several
reasons to suggest that this is not a major problem. First, Warner and Wu (2005) find that funds
change advisory contract types infrequently.16 Second, for the CRSP matched sample, I examine the
choice of a declining-rate advisory contract using characteristics as of the fund's first appearance in
CRSP. Using CRSP requires that I remove the multiple share class indicator, the minimum investment
amount, and services from the analysis, as CRSP does not provide these data.17 However, I attempt to
control for expected fund growth, using the range of fund sizes in the investment sector the year prior
(sector spread) and the number of funds in the sector (sector funds). Sector spread represents

variation in how large the fund may grow, and sector funds represent the competitiveness of the
sector.
The results, presented in column 3, are consistent with declining-rate advisory contracts being a
response to diseconomies of scale. Aggressive funds have a 57% higher probability of using a decliningrate advisory contract than funds following a relatively non-aggressive strategy. Additionally, I find that
funds entering sectors with greater size variation are more likely to use a declining-rate advisory
contract, while funds entering more competitive sectors are less likely to use a declining-rate advisory
contract. These results suggest that declining-rate advisory contracts are more likely when there is
more uncertainty regarding how large the fund may grow, and are less likely when competition limits
growth potential.
Another potential concern of the analysis is that fund families may choose a single contract type for
similar funds. I control for this potential non-independence by grouping funds with similar strategies
within a family into a single observation, resulting in a sample of 1476 family-style groups. Table 4
presents the results of this analysis.18 Column 1 presents the probit analysis, where the dependent
variable equals one if any fund in the family-style group uses a declining-rate advisory contract. As the
proportion of actively managed funds increases so does the probable use of a declining-rate advisory
contract. Additionally, switching from a family-style group that invests in debt to one that invests in
equity increases the probable use of a declining-rate advisory contract by 22%.
Table 4. Probit analysis of choosing a declining-rate advisory contract, controlling for family and style
influences. I regress an indicator set equal to one if any of the funds in the family-style grouping uses a
declining-rate advisory contract and zero otherwise, for the 1476 family-style groupings. Active % is the
percentage of actively managed funds in the family-style grouping. Equity is an indicator variable that
takes the value of one if the grouping invests primarily in equity and zero if the fund invests primarily in
debt. Multi class % is the percentage of funds in the grouping that have multiple classes of shares.
Front load % is the percentage of funds in the grouping that have a front-end load. Back load % is the
percentage of funds with a back-end load. Ln (min invest) is the median of the natural log of the
minimum investment that the fund requires to open an account for an investor for the funds in the
group. Turnover is the median turnover of the funds in the group. Ln(size) is the median of the natural
log of fund's total net assets in the group. Ln(Family size) is the natural log of all assets controlled by
the fund's family. Services is the median number of services required by the advisory contract. In
column 1, the intercept represents the probability that a fund will choose a declining-rate advisory
contract when all dichotomous variables are set equal to zero and all continuous variables are set at
their mean. The intercept for column 1 of this table represents the probability that a passively
managed domestic debt fund possessing mean turnover, fund size, family size, and services will choose
a declining-rate advisory contract. The coefficients reported for the dichotomous variable represent
the incremental change in the probable choice of a declining-rate advisory contract when the
dichotomous variable changes from zero to one, leaving all other variables unchanged. In the case of
the continuous explanatory variables, the reported coefficient represents the change in the probability
implied by a two-standard-deviation increase. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.

Logit
Intercept
Active %
Equity
Multi class %
Front load %
Back load %
Ln(min invest)
Turnover
Ln(size)
Ln(family size)
Services
Family funds
Obs
Psuedo-R2
Adjusted-R2

0.319***
(83.11)
0.077***
(7.03)
0.070**
(5.84)
0.023
(0.71)
0.019
(0.43)
− 0.023
(0.63)
− 0.093***
(16.19)
− 0.001
(0.01)
0.155***
(14.84)
0.138***
(10.13)
0.086***
(10.22)
0.147***
(19.01)
1476
0.1184

Percentages
− 0.406***
(− 3.96)
0.137**
(2.51)
0.043*
(1.81)
0.032
(1.21)
0.040
(0.74)
− 0.034
(− 0.62)
− 0.014***
(− 4.60)
− 0.008
(− 0.16)
0.034***
(3.90)
0.012*
(1.83)
0.009***
(3.00)
− 0.001
(− 0.44)
1476
0.0589

Column 2, presents the proportion of funds within the family-style group that uses a declining-rate
advisory contract. As the proportion of actively managed funds within the family-style group increases,
so does the proportion of funds using a declining-rate advisory contract. Similarly, family-style groups
investing primarily in equity have a higher percentage of funds using declining-rate advisory contracts.
The results presented in Table 3, Table 4 suggest that declining-rate advisory contracts are a response
to diseconomies of scale.

8.2. The amount of advisory rate decline
Table 2, Table 3, Table 4 all present evidence that the choice of a declining-rate advisory contract is a
response to diseconomies of scale; this suggests that declining-rate advisory contracts are a means of
keeping marginal compensation in line with declining marginal product. If this is true, then it seems

reasonable that funds with greater exposure to diseconomies of scale should also specify more
advisory rate decline in their contracts.
I examine the amount of advisory rate decline in the contracts using a two-stage Heckman sample
selection model (as I only observe advisory rate decline for funds with declining-rate advisory
contracts).19 The first stage analyzes the choice of a declining-rate advisory contract (column 1 of
Table 3). The second stage estimates the amount of advisory rate decline in the contract, controlling
for the selection of a declining-rate advisory contract. The coefficients from the second stage are
presented in columns 1 and 3 of Table 5, while columns 2 and 4 present the marginal effects, following
Core and Guay (1999).
Table 5. Analysis of the amount of advisory rate decline. This table presents the results from analysis of
the amount of decline present in the declining-rate advisory contracts using sample selection
methodology. The first stage in this analysis is the probit analysis presented in column 1 of Table 3
which analyzes what funds will choose a declining-rate advisory contract. Columns 1 and 3 present the
results from the second stage of the sample selection methodology which examines the amount of
decline present in the declining-rate advisory contract. Columns 2 and 4 present the marginal effects of
these variables on the amount of decline in the contract, accounting for their influence on the
probability that the fund uses a declining-rate advisory contract. The sample is composed of 4366
funds that filed an N-SAR in the 2002 calendar year. Average drop is the highest advisory rate specified
in the advisory contract minus the lowest advisory rate divided by the number of advisory rate
changes. Range is the highest advisory rate specified in the advisory contract minus the lowest
advisory rate. Active is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the fund is actively managed
and zero if the fund is passively managed. Equity is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if
the fund invests primarily in equity and zero if the fund invests primarily in debt. Aggressive is an
indicator variable that takes the value of one if the fund's stated strategy is aggressive growth or
aggressive capital appreciation and zero otherwise. Multi class is an indicator variable that takes the
value of one if the fund offers multiple classes of shares and the value of zero if the fund only has one
share class. Breaks represents the total number of advisory rate breaks specified in the contract. Front
load is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the fund has a front-end load and zero
otherwise. Back load is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the fund has a redemption
fee or a contingent deferred sales charge and zero otherwise. As multi class will be perfectly correlated
with front load and back load, I orthogonalize both with respect to multi class. Ln(min invest) is the
natural log of the minimum investment that the fund requires to open an account for an investor.
Breaks is the number of breakpoints specified in the advisory contract. Turnover is the lesser of the
fund's purchases and sales divided by average net assets. Ln(size) is the natural log of fund's total net
assets. Ln(family size) is the natural log of all assets controlled by the fund's family. Services is the
number of services required by the advisory contract. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively.

Intercept

Average drop
− 0.138***
(− 8.93)

Average drop marginal effects

Range
− 0.391***
(− 12.52)

Range marginal effects

Active
Equity
Multi class
Front load
Back load
Ln(min invest)
Breaks
Turnover (*10− 3)
Ln(size)
Ln(family size)
Services
Obs
ρ

Average drop
0.055***
(7.93)
0.010***
(3.35)
0.012***
(3.67)
0.008
(1.05)
0.002
(0.28)
− 0.001**
(− 3.10)
− 0.004***
(− 9.38)
− 0.013
(− 1.38)
0.006***
(7.05)
− 0.0003
(− 0.46)
0.002***
(3.89)
4366
0.996***
(1120.76)

Average drop marginal effects
0.024***
0.007***
0.002
− 0.007
0.010**
− 0.0001
− 0.004***
− 0.012**
0.001**
− 0.001***
0.0001*
4366

Range
0.113***
(8.07)
0.019***
(3.09)
0.039***
(6.08)
0.049***
(3.14)
− 0.007
(− 0.42)
− 0.004***
(− 4.34)
0.016***
(23.10)
− 0.005
(− 0.29)
0.014***
(7.77)
0.001
(0.84)
0.004***
(4.79)
4366
0.998***
(1764.42)

Range marginal effects
0.042***
0.012***
0.014***
0.010
0.015
− 0.001***
0.016***
− 0.005
0.002**
− 0.001*
0.001***
4366

Regardless of how it is measured, I find that funds with greater exposure to diseconomies of scale,
namely actively managed funds and equity funds have larger advisory rate declines. The marginal
effect of changing from an index fund to an actively managed fund and from a debt fund to an equity
fund increases the average drop by 38%, and 11% of its mean, respectively. These same changes
increase the range by 28%, and 8% of its mean, respectively. The results suggest that funds with
relatively greater exposure to diseconomies of scale are more likely to use a declining-rate advisory
contract and to specify larger advisory rate decline in those contracts.
While my focus is on pecuniary incentives, it is possible that other factors, for example, career
concerns, could mitigate the need for high pay-performance sensitivity as a fund grows, and might
explain my results. That is, advisors of actively managed funds, equity funds or aggressive equity funds
may be more concerned with the prospect of managing a hedge fund than their respective
counterpart. However, the majority of the CRSP matched sample started prior to the rapid growth in
hedge funds, suggesting that running a hedge fund was not a primary career concern when these
contracts where designed. Additionally, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) suggest that an advisor's primary
career concern is not receiving a promotion, but avoiding termination.

Fear of termination also has the potential to explain my results, if the sensitivity of terminations to
performance increases with fund size faster for actively managed funds, equity funds, and aggressive
equity funds than their counterparts. However, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) study the termination of
growth equity fund advisors (aggressive equity funds) and find no evidence that size affects the
sensitivity of termination to performance. Therefore, in order for fear of termination to explain my
findings, the sensitivity of termination to performance for non-aggressive equity funds would have to
be negatively related to fund size. While I cannot rule out this possibility, it seems unlikely.

8.3. Analysis of the advisory rate drop across breakpoints
The above analysis suggests that declining-rate advisory contracts are a mechanism for keeping
marginal compensation in line with declining marginal product. Therefore, examining the advisory rate
drops should provide information about how the advisor's marginal product falls as the fund grows.
Each declining-rate advisory contract contains between 1 and 8 breakpoints, with a mean of 2.8
(median of 2) breakpoints, resulting in a sample of 3876 breakpoints. Panel A of Table 6 presents a
description of the sample.
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of the breakpoints. I search the SEC's EDGAR Web site for all N-SARB
filings during the 2002 calendar year. A declining-rate advisory contract is an advisory contract that
specifies several advisory rates, which decline as fund size increases. I collect each advisory rate
specified by the declining-rate advisory contract, as well as the number of breaks specified in each
contract. In this sample, each break is considered an individual observation. Advisory rate drop is the
drop in the advisory rate at the breakpoint. Percent advisory rate drop is the drop in the advisory rate
as a percentage of the advisory rate prior to the drop. Breaks represent the total number of advisory
rate breaks specified in the contract. Breaknum is an ordinal variable, specifying the breakpoint's
location in the contract.

Breaks
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Totals

Panel A. Sample composition
Number of contracts
% of sample
Observations
333
24.2
1376
451
32.8
1043
240
17.4
592
128
9.3
352
76
5.5
224
28
2.0
148
99
7.2
120
21
1.5
21
1376
3876

% of sample
35.5
26.9
15.3
9.1
5.8
3.8
3.1
0.5

BreakNum
1st
2nd
3 rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
Total

Panel B. Descriptive statistics
Advisory rate drop
% advisory rate drop
Mean
Median
Mean
Median
0.073
0.050
11.3
10.0
0.053
0.050
9.3
8.3
0.041
0.050
8.1
7.7
0.037
0.025
7.9
6.2
0.026
0.020
6.0
4.8
0.018
0.015
4.5
3.7
0.014
0.010
3.5
2.6
0.011
0.010
3.1
2.3
0.052
0.050
9.1
7.1

Observations
1376
1043
592
352
224
148
120
21
3876

Panel B of Table 6 presents the mean and median advisory rate drop, the raw drop in the advisory rate,
and the percentage advisory rate drop, the advisory rate drop as a percentage of the prior advisory
rate. Breaknum specifies the location of the breakpoint in the contract. Panel B shows that, as the fund
grows through its contract, the advisory rate drop at each breakpoint shrinks.20 This suggests that the
advisor's earlier marginal product reductions are more severe than the later reductions.

9. Advisory contract type and performance
Lastly, I examine the relationship between advisory contract type and performance. Given the
evidence suggesting that declining-rate advisory contracts are a mechanism for keeping marginal
compensation in line with declining marginal product, it seems unlikely that there will be a
performance difference based on contract type.
Given that the N-SAR filings do not provide information regarding fund performance, I use the CRSP
matched sample. I examine monthly raw and four-factor adjusted returns over the five years
surrounding the N-SAR cross-section and the five years following the cross-section. The four-factor
adjusted returns are based on the Fama and French four-factor model; the factor loadings are
estimated using a 36-month rolling window.
Each January, I form mutual fund portfolios, based on strategy and contract type. The average
difference between these portfolios is presented in Table 7. Panel A presents the value-weighted
portfolio results, where the weights are based on prior year-end fund size. Panel B presents the equally
weighted portfolio results. I find no evidence of a relationship between advisory contract type and
performance, which is consistent with the mutual fund industry being a competitive marketplace
where relatively inefficient contracts are eliminated.
Table 7. Analysis of the effect of contract type on fund performance. Each January, I form portfolios of
mutual funds based on their strategy and advisory contract type. The table presents the average
monthly difference in portfolio returns. Panel A presents the results for the value-weighted portfolios

where the weights are determined based on fund size in December. Panel B presents the equally
weighted portfolio results. The four-factor adjusted returns are based on the Fama and French fourfactor model. Factor loadings are calculated using a 36-month rolling estimation window. ***, **, *
indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
2000–2004
Panel A: Value-weighted portfolios
Raw
Four-factor adjusted
Panel B: Equally weighted portfolios
Raw
Four-factor adjusted

2003–2007

− 0.0004
(− 0.46)
0.0004
(0.65)

− 0.0004
(− 0.76)
− 0.0001
(− 0.00)

− 0.0005
(− 0.66)
− 0.0003
(− 0.58)

− 0.0003
(− 1.00)
0.0001
(0.07)

10. Conclusion
I investigate the choice of a declining-rate advisory contract over the predominant single-rate advisory
contract. This is the first paper to examine this decision, which is surprising, given that a third of funds
use a declining-rate advisory contract, and that these funds manage about half of the dollars under
management.
I first demonstrate that the choice of a declining-rate advisory contract is economically significant, as it
significantly reduces the compensation that the advisor would have received with a single-rate
contract. Additionally, it reduces the price that investors pay for investment management.
I then provide direct evidence that the choice of a declining-rate advisory contract is a response to a
fund's exposure to diseconomies of scale. I find that the probability that a fund uses a declining-rate
advisory contract, and the amount of advisory rate decline in the contract, is higher for (a) actively
managed funds, (b) equity funds, and (c) equity funds that pursue aggressive strategies. These results
suggest that a declining-rate advisory contract is a mechanism for keeping marginal compensation in
line with an advisor's declining marginal product.
That funds ex ante choose a compensation scheme where the advisor's pay-performance sensitivity is
inversely related to size, when the advisor's marginal product is also inversely related to size, has
implications for studies of CEO compensation—namely, that the empirically observed inverse
relationship between CEO pay-performance and size may not imply that agency problems are more
severe at larger firms; the lower pay-performance sensitivity may result from reduction in the CEO's
marginal product as the firm grows. This is not to say that these large-firm CEOs are unproductive, only
that their marginal product has diminished as the firm has grown.

Lastly, I find no evidence of a performance difference between funds with single-rate advisory
contracts and those with a declining-rate advisory contract. This is consistent with the mutual fund
industry being a relatively efficient contracting environment.
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4 The MFPP states, “The management rate schedule shall be reasonable and shall contain breakpoints
that provide meaningful economies of scale to shareholders.”
5 Here “owns” refers to the amount of assets the advisor has claim to.
6 I present the potential sources of diseconomies of scale for completeness.
7 Stein (2002) defines soft information as information that cannot be verified by anyone other than the
person who produces it. An example of soft information in the mutual fund industry is provided
by Chen et al. (2004): the ability to talk to a firm's CEO versus simply reading the firm's financial
statements. Cashman and Deli (2009) present evidence of the importance of soft information,
as funds organize themselves to collocate investment decision rights with soft information.
8 Chordia, 2002, Hedge and McDermott, 2003, Edmister et al., 1996 all present evidence that, when a
company is added to an index, the costs associated with trading the stock decrease and the
liquidity of the firm increases significantly. This increased liquidity should allow larger
transactions to be executed at lower cost and with relatively less price impact.
9 I conduct my analysis at the portfolio level and I group multiple share classes within the same fund
into a single observation, since the share classes will have the same advisory contract.
10 The N-SAR filing specifically asks whether the advisory contract requires the advisor to provide 15
different services. A list of these services can be found in Table 1.
11 I remove all advisory contracts that include a performance fee as part of the advisor's compensation.
Keeping these contracts in the sample does not qualitatively change the results presented.
Additionally, I remove all money market funds.
12 Christoffersen (2001) examines money market fund managers' decision to waive fees and argues
that fee waivers provide an indirect channel for setting a performance-based fee structure.
13 I do this for the actively managed equity subsample to make the hand matching manageable. I follow
the methodology of Cashman et al. (2009)query. I need CRSP to obtain monthly fund size—
simply using year-end size potentially would bias my calculations, as the S&P 500 lost 22% of its
value in 2002.
14 Nanda et al. (2009)query find that funds offering multiple share classes are more exposed to
liquidity-motivated trading, while Nanda et al., 2000, Chordia, 1996, Aragon, 2007 find that
front-end loads, back-end loads, and minimum investment amounts reduce a fund's exposure
to liquidity-motivated trading.
15 The 26.4% probability comes from adding the 10.9% for the benchmark fund and the 15.5% for the
actively managed indicator.
16 Warner and Wu (2005) find that 1.5% of their sample of year-to-year mutual fund advisory contracts
changes type.
17 Keeping these variables in the analysis at their 2002 levels does not qualitatively change my results.
18 I obtain similar results when I limit the sample to families that use both types of advisory contracts.

19 Forty-seven

declining-rate advisory contracts contain errors regarding their stated advisory rates; I
drop these from my analysis.
20 This result holds in multivariate analysis, controlling for the first advisory rate in the contract and the
fund characteristics in the average drop analysis.

